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THE INTEGRITY OF THE ARBITRAL PROCESS 
Roger I. Abrams* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over twenty years ago Dean Shulman and Professor Cox de-
bated through the pages of the Harvard Law Review the question 
of the role law should play in labor arbitration.1 Shulman urged 
"that the law stay out,"2 while Cox argued that courts would come 
to understand the special nature of the arbitration process and would 
accordingly limit the extent of judicial intervention. 3 The impact of 
their discussion has, of course, been mooted by the numerous judicial 
decisions implanting private arbitration within the federal law of the 
collective agreement. 4 From the Supreme Court has come a formid-
able legal superstructure for the labor arbitration process, and sup-
port for labor arbitration is now a paramount national policy. 
It is not the object of this Article either to belabor the wisdom 
of these decisions or to suggest fundamental changes in the labor ar-
bitration system. The question does remain, however, of how to en-
sure that labor arbitration continues to merit its preferred status. In 
offering an answer to that question, this Article suggests that the key 
to private arbitration's future contributions to the national labor law 
system lies in maintenance of the integrity of arbitral procedures. 
Thus the focus of the inquiry will be directed at the basic elements 
of arbitration procedure essential to the achievement of accurate re-
sults in an efficient manner acceptable to the parties. The legal de-
velopments of the past two decades demand a thorough reexamina-
tion of how labor arbitration is to be conducted. 
The reasons proffered in support of designating labor arbitration 
as the appropriate forum for resolving industrial disputes are well 
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. B.A. 1967, 
Cornell University; J.D. 1970, Harvard University.-Ed. 
1. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956); 
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 
(1955). 
2. Shulman, supra note 1, at 1024. 
3. Cox, supra note 1, at 604-05. 
4. See text at notes 5-28 infra. This historical development of labor arbitration 
as a private dispute-resolving mechanism is traced by R. FLEMING, THE LABOR .ARBI-
TRATION PROCESS 1-30 (1965), and more recently in B. LANDIS, VALUE JUDGMENTS 
IN ARBITRATION: A CASE STUDY OF SAUL WALLEN 2-14 (1977). 
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known. In supporting labor arbitration, the Supreme Court has re-
lied upon evidence of congressional intent5 and upon the principle 
of allocating decisionmaking power to the more expert tribunal, 0 as 
well as upon the assumption that labor peace can be best accom-
plished through enforced use of the pre-established private mech-
anism for dispute resolution. 7 Arbitrators, knowledgeable in the 
common law of the shop, were said to be better equipped than 
judges to resolve controversies arising in the industrial setting. 8 
Thus, in fleshing out the new federal common law of the labor agree-
ment, the Court concluded that the judiciary was obliged to send 
union and management to this preferred forum for resolution of dis-
putes, unless it was clear that the matter lay beyond the scope of ar-
bitration. 9 Moreover, the Court stated that it was not the job of 
courts, upon completion of an arbitration, to reexamine the merits 
of the dispute.10 Essentially, the Court limited review to a deter-
mination of whether the arbitrator had the power under the collec-
tive agreement to make his award.11 
The, foreseeable effect of these decisions was to keep the parties 
out of court. Except where the contract clearly and expressly ex-
cluded the disputed issue from arbitration, resistance to the process 
was rendered futile.12 Even frivolous grievances were to be sent 
to arbitration so that its "therapeutic values" would •be allowed to 
5. "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be 
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application 
or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act,§ 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970). 
6. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960); 
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960); 
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) 
[hereinafter cited collectively as Steelworkers Trilogy], 
7. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
8. ''The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and compe-
tence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly 
informed." Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582. 
9. 363 U.S. at 582-83. 
State courts have not uniformly followed the Steelworkers Trilogy formulation 
in public-sector arbitration. In a recent case under the Taylor Law-the New York 
public employee's fair employment act, N.Y. C!v. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 
1973)-the New York Court of Appeals held that arbitration would only be directed 
if the matter expressly, directly, and unequivocally fell within the arbitration promise. 
Acting Superintendent of Schools v. United Liverpool Faculty Assn., 42 N.Y.2d 509, 
369 N.E.2d 746, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1977). 
10. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596. The First Circuit recently restated the 
appropriate judicial role as one of applying a "rule of non-reviewability." Betten-
court v. Boston Edison Co., 560 F.2d 1045, 1049 (1st Cir. 1977). 
11. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. See Dunau, Three Problems i11 Labor 
Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REV. 427, 439-62 (1969). 
12. Warrior & Gui/Navigation, 363 U.S. at 584-85. 
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flourish. 13 Labor peace was to be promoted by affording the union 
an opportunity to vindicate its contractual rights through peaceful 
private adjudication in lieu of strife-i.e ., the "carrot" approach to 
labor peace. 
When unions ignored the judicial "carrot," the Supreme Court 
in its 1970 decision in Boys Markets14 supplied management with 
the "stick" of ·the labor injunction.15 In that case, the Court found 
the arbitral process to be too important in the scheme of national 
labor policy to be sacrificed to union self-help. Notwithstanding ·the 
substantial obstacles of the Norris-LaGuardia Act16 and an eight-
year-old decision directly on point, 11 the Court, speaking ·through 
Justice Brennan, concluded that support of labor arbitration required 
not merely specific enforcement of the promise to arbitrate, but 
specific enforcement of the collateral promise not to strike. 18 
Further support for the arbitral process was supplied by. Court 
decisions channeling employee grievances through contractual pro-
cedures10 and demarcating a union's duty to represent unit em-
ployees fairly in those procedures. 20 Individual employees were re-
quired to utilize the contract's grievance procedure to redress their 
grievances, even those based upon claims of racial discrimination;21 
the use of self-help collective methods was not to be protected under 
section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).22 More-
over, once involved in the grievance and arbitration process, the em-
ployee was left with the weak reed of the union's duty of fair repre-
13. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568. 
14. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). 
15. See Abrams, The Labor Injunction and the Refusal To Cross Another Union's 
Picket Line, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 178 (1975). 
16. 29 u.s.c. §§ 101-115 (1970). 
17. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). 
18. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 253. Four years later, the Court went a step 
further by implying a no-strike obligation from the presence of a contractual arbi-
tration provision arguably covering the dispute in question. The Court then specifi-
cally enforced the implied obligation. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 
(1974). 
19. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 
(1975). 
20. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
21. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 70. Likewise, an employee asserting a con-
tractual claim must exhaust available contractual procedures. Compare Republic 
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), with Smith v. Evening News Assn., 
371 U.S. 195 (1962). 
22. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 70. Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees, 
inter alia, the right of employees "to engage in . . . concerted activities for the 
purpose of ... mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Employer 
interference with the exercise of this right is made an unfair labor practice by § 8 
(a) (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970). 
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sentation in pursuing his claim. 23 A union could settle a grievance 
short of arbitration, so long as it acted without bad faith, 24 and retain 
control over the privately created dispute-resolution mechanism. 
The autonomy of the grievance and arbitration system was reaf-
firmed. 25 
Labor arbitration has thus been moved "center stage" by two de-
cades of judicial determinations. 26 Arbitrators have been given 
unique power to resolve disputes with the support, but not the inter-
ference, of external legal institutions.27 Although the courts dis-
claim any expertise in the ways of labor arbitration, they have never-
theless readily lent their assistance to the process. When parties pri-
vately negotiate a collective bargaining agreement that includes an 
arbitration provision, they automatically obtain the "support" of the 
legal system. Their voluntary acceptance of a mechanism for dis-
pute resolution assures ready enforcement of that contract provision 
at ·the behest of either party. 28 
23. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See generally Note, Fair Representa-
tion and Union Discipline, 19 YALE L.J. 730, 734-35 (1970). 
24. 386 U.S. at 191. 
25. In Vaca the Court decided that the merits of the contract claim could be 
addressed in federal court if the employee had vaulted the barrier of proving a union 
breach of the duty of fair representation, although the judicial option of sending 
the matter to arbitration was preserved. 386 U.S. at 196. It might be suggested 
that the federal judiciary is competent to hear the merits of this type of grievance 
because a union found to have breached its duty of fair representation is unlikely 
to represent the aggrieved employee adequately in the court-ordered arbitration. In 
any case, this aspect of Vaca is discordant with the trend of judicial obeisance to 
the labor arbitration process. 
The only other major exception to this trend of unlimited judicial support for 
the arbitral process arose when policy favoring arbitration directly conflicted with 
statutory antidiscrimination policy. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 
36, 50 (1974), the court allowed a Title VII suit to be brought by the grievant, 
notwithstanding an unfavorable arbitration result on the grievant's discharge, because 
of the "distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights," 
26. The National Labor Relations Board has also contributed its measure of sup-
port for the labor arbitration process. Its policy came into full bloom in the Collyer 
doctrine, developed in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). Alleged 
violations of§ 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), that were arguably cognizable in arbitration would now be 
deferred to the parties' own private forum. After arbitration, the NLRB would dis-
turb the arbitral resolution only if it were "repugnant to the purposes and policies 
of the Act." Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). 
27. "Arbitrators experience a unique position among the various decision makers 
who respond to the issues raised in labor disputes in America. Unlike federal and 
state judges and administrative agencies, the labor arbitrator is almost entirely un-
fettered by legal concepts; his judgment is insulated against displacing judicial re-
view." Jones, Evidentiary Concepts in Labor Arbitration: Some Modern Variations 
on Ancient Legal Themes, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1241 (1966). 
28. Under the Collyer doctrine, they have also contracted themselves out of direct 
NLRB supervision over a large spectrum of contractually based unfair labor prac-
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Although recent years have seen a significant concentration of 
decisionmaking power on labor arbitration, little discussion has 
centered on how the participants in the process should react to its 
newfound prominence in the scheme of national labor policy. There 
is no indication that arbitral jurisprudence, the essential source of ar-
bitrators' decisions, has significantly changed over the past twenty 
years. 29 Arbitration procedure remains, for the most part, a matter 
of the parties' choice. But the developments in the legal environ-
ment external to the arbitral process necessarily require some rethink-
ing about how the process itself should be conducted. The freedom 
to operate without legal intrusion but with considerable legal support 
devolves upon the participants-union, management, and arbiq:a-
tors-a responsibility to ensure that labor arbitration effectuates na-
tional policy. 
A recent judicial signal indicates ·that a reexamination of the ar-
bitral process is both necessary and appropriate. In Hines v. Anchor 
Motor Freight, Inc.,30 the Supreme Court noted that a final and bind-
ing arbitration award was "reviewable and vulnerable if tainted by 
breach of duty on the part of the union, even though the. employer 
had not conspired with the union."31 The Court concluded that in-
quiry must be directed to whether the arbitration process "has funda-
mentally malfunctioned by reason of the bad-faith performance of 
the union,"32 for if "contractual processes have been seriously 
!}awed," the "integrity of the arbitral process" has been under-
mined.33 "Congress," stated the Court, "has put its blessing on pri-
vate dispute settlement arrangements provided in collective agree-
ments, but it was anticipated, we are sure, that contractual machinery 
would operate within some minimum levels of integrity."34 The 
preferred status of labor arbitration is thus not immutable. The 
tices. The Board has, however, wisely retracted its earlier extension of deferral 
to alleged violations of § 8(a)(l) and § 8(a)(3). General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 
N.L.R.B. No. 102 (1977), reported in [1976-77] NLRB Dec. (CCH) ,r 17,962. 
29. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (3d ed. 
1973). 
30. 424 U.S. 554 (1976). 
31. 424 U.S. at 568 (noting the ruling in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 
(1964) ). The petitioners' central claim was that their union failed to investigate 
the asserted grounds for their discharge, thereby breaching its duty of fair represen-
tation. The Court granted certiorari only on the question of whether the final and 
binding arbitration award denying the grievance barred petitioners' claim, and thus 
it did not address the adequacy of the unfair representation contention. 
32. 424 U.S. at 569. 
33. 424 U.S. at 567, 570. 
34. 424 U.S. at 571. Although Hines dealt with how the negligence of one 
party to the arbitration affected the integrity of the arbitration process, the message 
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Court has given clear notice that if arbitration is to continue its spe-
cial role in national labor policy, attention must be given to the way 
in which it is conducted. 
Il. THE NATURE OF THE ARBITRAL PROCESS 
A. The Assumed Attributes of Arbitration 
Labor arbitrators decide the most important issues facing union-
ized working people today-those involving individual employee job 
rights. Discharge and discipline cases constitute the most common 
. issues faced by arbitrators; job rights cases involving seniority, wage 
rates, and pay issues fill arbitration dockets. 35 With the courts and 
the streets now foreclosed, the contract rights of the working person 
must find protection in the forum of arbitration or be lost. 36 
Labor arbitration has been traditionally lauded for its flexibility 
and informality. The arbitrator, as the chosen instrument of the 
parties, is assumed to be controlled by their agreement and no other 
forces. Privately employed by the parties,37 the arbitrator is viewed 
as an itinerant problem solver, relied upon by both union and man-
agement for his informed practical solution of a dispute they could 
not resolve themselves. 38 Stare decisis is proclaimed inoperative 
is clear that the process itself must be examined for flaws. Malfunction in the 
process will make the results of the process vulnerable to judicial attack. 
35. In fiscal year 1976, of a total of 6855 issues reported in Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service closed arbitration cases, 2150 were discharge and discipline 
issues, 969 were seniority issues, and 912 were wage rate and pay issues. UNITED 
STATES FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE: TwENTY-NINTII ANNUAL 
REPORT 55-56 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FMCS ANNUAL REPORT]. Professor Lon 
Fuller characterized employee job rights as "a species of property" earned by indi-
vidual workers. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV, 
3, 10 (1963 ). 
36. "Collective bargaining's most enduring monument may well be the rule of 
law which it has brought to the American industrial society. Without such a rule 
individuals would have infinitely less protection in their working lives than they 
now have. Yet we remain concerned that the very collective process which offers 
them protection may unduly subjugate individual rights." R. FLEMING, supra note 
4, at 130. 
37. Most labor arbitrators are members of one or both of the labor panels main-
tained by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service (FMCS). The AAA "is a private, non-profit organization 
founded in 1926 to foster the study of arbitration, to perfect the techniques of this 
method of dispute settlement under law and to administer arbitration in accordance 
with the agreement of the parties." AMERICAN ARBITRATION AssN., LABOR ARBITRA• 
TION: PROCEDURES AND TEcHNIQUES 23 (1975) (booklet). Congress created the 
FMCS in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 "to assist parties to labor disputes in indus-
tries affecting commerce to settle such disputes through conciliation and mediation." 
29 u.s.c. § 173 (1970). 
38. The arbitrator is thus seen, to borrow Cardozo's colorful phrase, as a "knight-
errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness." B. 
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and the rules of evidence are not binding. The process is praised 
as cheap, fast, and informal. 
This, in brief, is the accepted portrait of the process to which 
the law has lent its considerable support. 39 It rests upon the be-
havorial assumption that the parties will, in fact, administer their pri-
vate mechanism with the help of a talented adjudicator in a fair man-
ner, providing correct results expeditiously. Experience, however, 
belies the assumption. 40 Economy is asserted as a central benefit, 
but arbitration is far from cost-free.41 Speed is a posited attribute, 
but one may seriously question whether a process that on the average 
takes over seven months can be characterized as "speedy."42 More-
over, the ·assumptions supporting the present formless arbitration 
model are challenged in arbitrations where the union and the grievant 
do not have coincident interests, where the arbitrator has an undis-
closed-or even disclosed-personal interest in the case at hand, 
where either party is poorly represented before the arbitrator, where 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TIIB JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921). Professor Fuller de-
scribed this expansive conception as the labor arbitrator as "labor relations physi-
cian": 
The . . . conception expects the arbitrator to adapt his procedures to the case 
at hand. Indeed, in its more extreme form it rejects the notion that his powers 
for good should be restrained at all by procedural limitations. By this view 
the arbitrator has a roving commission to straighten things out, the immediate 
controversy marking the occasion for, but not the limits of, his intervention. 
Fuller, supra note 35, at 4. 
39. Arbitration practice is consistent, however, only in its inconsistency: "Arbi-
tration hearings run the gamut from utmost informality to high formality. The 
means of presenting facts range from conversation across the table to examination 
of sworn witnesses in meticulous accord with the rules of evidence. Styles vary 
from one relationship to another." Dunau, supra note 11, at 437. 
The AAA has created a set of "Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules," which parties 
may follow by mutual agreement. "The rules . . . are not binding upon arbitrators 
but do set guidelines as to hearing procedures." Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. United 
Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488, 491 (C.D. Cal. 1967). It is, of course, impossible 
to ascertain whether there is compliance with these broad, permissive rules. 
40. The traditional view of labor arbitration may be "one of those assumptions 
we collectively try to work with so long as they are reasonably adequate. When 
it becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no longer a valid assumption which 
stands up under the realities of actual experience," we can no longer continue "to 
rely on it." Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 59 
F.2d 994, 1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.). 
41. The average total arbitrator charge in a sample of FMCS arbitrations in 
fiscal year 1976 was $662.39 per case. FMCS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, 
at 51. If the parties are represented by attorneys and a transcript is taken, the 
cost significantly increases. 
The Bureau of National Affairs reported recently on a survey done for the AFL-
CIO's American Federationist that estimated the total cost to a union for a one-
day arbitration at $2,220. FACTS FOR BARGAINING (BNA), June 27, 1977, at 1. 
42. The average elapsed time from the grievance filing to arbitration award of 
a sample of FMCS cases in fiscal year 1976 was 233.5 days. FMCS ANNUAL RE-
PORT, supra note 35, at 53. 
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issues beyond the coij].petence and special expertise of the arbitrator 
are presented, or where the procedures followed do not afford ade-
quate protection for legitimate and substantial public and private in-
terests. Labor arbitration cannot be defended simply on the broad, 
unverified assumption that in many instances it works well. 43 Nor 
can the competence of the present corps of professional arbitrators 
be defended with the market theory that the parties continue to select 
them,44 for, _after all, they are the "only game in town." The private 
system of labor arbitration has been vested with enormous power, 
and, if its fiduciary role is to be conserved, its procedures must be 
open to continuing examination. 
B. Fundamental Val.ues Underlying Institutional Design 
The Supreme Court has stated that labor arbitration must meet 
"some minimum levels of integrity."45 Although the specific re-
quirements imposed by that abecedarian standard were not made at 
all clear, this Article will propose the adoption of certain funda-
mental procedures designed both to satisfy the Court's prescription 
and, more broadly, to ensure that the performance of labor arbitra-
tion is commensurate with its national responsibilities. In develop-
ing the outlines of this proposal, which will for convenience be called 
the "basic labor ar,bitration model," we should not merely focus upon 
the possible dysfunctions of the present norm, but also weigh the 
costs and asserted benefits of establishing certain uniform proce-
dures. Improvements in the system's accuracy may come at the ex-
pense of efficiency, and advancements in either of these respects may 
yet be unacceptable to the parties involved. Thus, if the basic labor 
arbitration model is to offer an acceptable game plan for the institu-
tion's future, it must be cognizant of the various interests that arbitra-
tion serves as well as of ·the demands to which it must answer. In 
sum,. the basic model must be crafted to serve the national labor 
goals of industrial peace and equitable adjudication of private claims 
while also meeting the reasonable expectations of the parties. 40 
43. A systematic empirical study of labor arbitration is certainly in order. See 
generally Roomkin & Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Regulation: A 
Proposal, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1440 (1977). Fleming has detailed an agenda of re• 
search issues. R. FLEMING, supra note 4, at 203-22. 
44. See Wallen, Dispelling the Hays' Haze, Address to the 12th Annual Institute 
of Labor, The Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas (Oct. 29, 1965), re-
printed in R. SMITII, L. MERRIFIELD & D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND 
LlBOR ARBITRATION 300-04 (1970). 
45. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976). 
46. A reasonable construction of any collective bargaining agreement is that 
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The procedural elements of the basic model for labor arbitration 
must maximize the probability that the arbitrator will reach a correct 
result. 47 Parties to a collective bargaining agreement certainly in-
tend that their privately appointed neutral dispose of their disputes 
in a manner, and with a result, consistent with their mutual expecta-
tions. 48 Using the construct of a "range of reasonable outcome ex-
pectations" as a measure of accuracy, we might say that outcomes 
that fall within the spectra of decisions anticipated by the parties 
are "correct."49 
To illustrate, consider the discharge of an employee for conduct 
outside of the work place, a common arbitral scenario. 50 Industrial 
jurisprudence suggests51 that management must demonstrate to the 
arbitrator the impact of the grievant's external activity on the em-
ployer's legitimate business interest.· Assuming no proof of such a 
nexus and a common "just cause" contractual provision for discharge, 
the overlapping spectra of the parties' reasonable expectations con-
the parties intend the arbitrators of their grievances to adjudicate within some 
procedural rubric. Although it was agreed that the arbitration decisions were 
to be final and binding upon the parties, implicit in such agreement was the 
concept of decisions reached by a fair means. 
Central Packing Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 195 F. Supp. 188, 192 (D. 
Kan. 1961). 
47. Dean Cramton suggests this value of accuracy, coupled with the values of, 
efficiency and acceptability, as the measures of necessary administrative process. 
Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 
VA. L. R.Ev. 585, 592-93 (1972). Barry Boyer employed Cramton's three criteria 
to evaluate agency procedural systems for solving polycentric problems. Boyer, Al-
ternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, 
Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REv. 111 (1972). 
48. "Given the absence of an objective external standard for accuracy . . . [t]he 
nearest approximation to an index of accuracy is consistency in adjudication • . . . 
In a closed hierarchical structure with no external referents consistency and accu-
racy tend to merge." Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Ad-
ministrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a 
Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm:. L. REV. 28, 44 (1976). Thus, the correctness of 
arbitral outcomes might be tested by measuring consistency-similar cases should 
be decided alike. Altering the perspective slightly, one may say that the parties 
should legitimately be able to anticipate predictable results from similar cases. Re-
sults inconsistent with these expectations are incorrect. See S.C.M. Allied Paper, 
Inc., 68 LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 1125, 1126 (1977) (Herrick, Arb.) (obligation 
of arbitrator to follow "right answer principle"). 
49. The "reasonable outcome expectations" of the parties will ordinarily overlap. 
Although the parties undoubtedly enter arbitration seeking differing results, both 
sides generally recognize that the reasonable arbitrator may decide the cases by ac-
cepting the opponent's result. 
50. See, e.g., Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 41 LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 713 (1963) 
(Mittenthal, Arb.); W. E. Caldwell Co., 28 LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 434, 436-37 
(1957) (Kesselman, Arb.); Inland Container Corp., 28 LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 312, 
314 (1957) (Ferguson, Arb.). 
51. Unlike legal principles, arbitral principles "suggest" and do not "demand" 
certain modes of analysis. 
240 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:231 
cerning the possible outcome of the arbitration would range from 
ordered reinstatement with full back pay ,to, perhaps, reinstatement 
without back pay if the employee did not use reasonable efforts to 
seek other employment after his discharge. 52 A blanket affirmance 
of the discharge without unique additional contract language or facts 
demonstrating impact on the employer's business would be a "wrong" 
result. Any model of labor arbitration must minimize the chances 
of such an outcome. 53 
In addition to accuracy, the basic arbitration model must assure 
the acceptability of the process to all concerned persons. Parties to 
an arbitration, grievants directly affected by the adjudication, and 
other employees in the shop must be satisfied with both the result 
reached and the process that led to the result. Although universal 
satisfaction may not be achievable, the design of the arbitral system 
must maximize this vaiue. Of course, if the process fa inaccurate, 
it will to that extent also be unacceptable. A "wrong" decision in 
the hypothetical discharge case sketched above would undoubtedly 
produce dissatisfaction and lead the losing party to consider a court 
suit to vacate the award. Although under current law the result 
would undoubtedly stand, assuming the arbitrator's opinion inter-
preted the contract language of "just cause" to have been satis-
fied, 54 the matter would be "settled" in only the narrowest sense of 
the term. 
It is also clear, however, that accuracy alone will not guarantee 
acceptability. Consider a situation where an arbitrator fails to allow 
a dischargee to confront his accuser in a discharge case based upon 
an assault of a supervisor. Even though a ruling against the grievant 
that upholds the discharge is clearly within the spectra of reasonable 
expectations, 55 the procedure through which the result was reached 
renders the process unacceptable. 56 The Supreme Court's dictum 
concerning the therapeutic value of arbitration57 is clearly relevant 
52. See, e.g., Albertson's Inc., 65 LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 1042, 1047 (1975) 
(Christopher, Arb.). 
53. Techniques for increasing accurate results include the selection of experts 
in labor relations as arbitrators and the allowance of the full development of facts 
and arguments to aid decisionmaking. See text at notes 67-112 infra. 
54. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
55. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co., 56 LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 908 (1971) (Traynor, 
Arb.); Pioneer Finishing Co., 52 LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 822 (1969) (Roberts 
Arb.). 
56. "If employers and unions concerned are to engage in agreements providing 
for arbitration, they must have complete confidence in the proceeding." Harvey 
Aluminum, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488,495 (C.D. Calif. 1967), 
57. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568. 
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to the construction of the arbitration model. Labor arbitration must 
not only reach a fair result, it must give the appearance of having 
done so through fair means. The legitimacy of any deoisionmak-
ing procedure is easily lost and, once lost, most difficult to retrieve 
in a collective relationship.118 Arbitration must offer a satisfactory 
procedure to those concerned ifit is to preserve its legitimacy. 
The third value to be achieved in the arbitral model is efficiency 
in operation. The process must work expeditiously if it is to serve 
as an attractive substitute for litigation or self-help. Procedures that 
do not assist the accuracy or acceptability of the process are not 
simply surplusage: they actively impair the value of efficiency. 
Certain procedures that arguably increase accuracy or acceptability 
may also detract from the efficiency of the process. Nevertheless, 
each trade-off must be evaluated on its own terms, for it is too sim-
plistic to suggest ·that every increase in procedure results in ineffi-
ciency. The three values are interdependent. Increasing efficiency 
does increase acceptability, •but only so long as the procedures used 
achieve correct results in a fair way. Similarly, the addition of pro-
cedures that increase the potential accuracy of the process may de-
crease the occasions on which it must be invoked, since parties will 
know that losing cases cannot be won before the arbitrator. 59 The 
less frequently it is employed, the more expeditious -the arbitral 
process may become. 60 
58. The posited basis for national law concerning enforcement of the arbitration 
promise is that labor peace will flow from the availability of an alternative mech-
anism for perfecting contractual rights. The premise breaks down if the process 
reaches either wrong results or correct results in an apparently unfair manner. 
59. It is true, of course, that certain matters are brought to arbitration for intra-
union "political" reasons unrelated to the merits of the case. R. FLEMING, supra 
note 4, at 207. 
60. One potentially useful way to analyze the components of the basic arbitration 
model is by using concepts developed by the Supreme Court in the context of admin-
istrative procedures. See generally Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1267 (1975). Although arbitration's connection with governmental power 
is too attenuated to make a convincing case for the direct, necessary application 
of the requirements of administrative due process, similarly important property rights 
are adjudicated in each procedure. Moreover, both due process in administrative 
law and basic process in arbitration law are intended simply as flexible indications 
of the standards necessary to ensure the integrity of the respective institutions. See 
R. FLEMING, supra note 4, at 165-66. Court decisions evaluating administrative adju-
dications are, of course, not directly applicable to labor arbitration. Moreover, Pro-
fessors Ernest Gellhom and Glen Robinson have pointed out that the procedures 
appropriate for one administrative agency are not necessarily transferable to another 
agency because of the difference in the respective substantive programs. Gellhom 
& Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 771 (1975). 
Likewise, the procedures of labor arbitration must be made to fit both the substan-
tive issues and the nature of the participants in the industrial relationship. It may 
be useful, nonetheless, to test arbitral sufficiency against the judicial benchmarks 
for administrative procedure. 
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Although undoubtedly elementary and unmistakably impres-
sionistic, an analysis of the elements of labor arbitration based upon 
achievement of the goals of accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability 
appears justified. The emphasis of these values within the arbitral 
process, coupled with the maintenance of the essentially diverse 
nature of individual voluntary systems, will meet judicial expec-
tations that private adjudication of labor disputes is consistent 
with national labor policy. Certainly a dispute-resolution system that 
is unable to achieve· a balanced development of these three values 
will not long stand as the centerpiece of national labor policy. 61 
Under the Court's most recent formulation of the administrative due process 
equation, it is essential to consider "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the 
private interest] through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards." Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
335 (1976). Clearly, then, accuracy is one of the values specifically identified as 
part of the due process inquiry. Similarly, the value of efficiency is invoked through 
mandatory consideration of the government's interest in minimizing administrative 
procedural burdens. 424 U.S. at 335. Lastly, acceptability is generally considered 
as part of "the private interest that will be affected by the official action." 424 
U.S. at 335. Thus, considered broadly, the due process equation is based upon the 
same value trinity posited earlier as the measure of arbitral integrity. 
Professor Jerry Mashaw, in his recent article criticizing the Court's approach 
in Matthews v. Eldridge as exclusively utilitarian, suggests a value-sensitive approach 
to due process analysis that would consider, in addition to accuracy, values such 
as individual dignity, equality of opportunity to be heard, and tradition. Mashaw, 
supra note 48. Although Professor Mashaw is undoubtedly correct that the Court 
emphasized utilitarian values in Eldridge, the Court did not expressly exclude future 
consideration of what Mashaw terms "individual dignity" considerations in appropri-
ate situations. This value Mashaw refers to as procedural "acceptability." Id. at 
51. If the Court's announced calculus is read as the definitive standard for due 
process review, this "acceptability" value must be identified when considering the 
private interest. See generally Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes 
-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CoRNELL L. REV. 1 (1974). 
Mashaw's suggested value of "equality" might be employed as an alternative meas-
ure of the adequacy of the labor arbitration process. As a general proposition, it 
is clear that the arbitrator must afford all concerned parties an equality of opportu-
nity to be heard. Discriminatory action by an arbitrator affects both the accepta-
bility and the accuracy of the process. Any disparate treatment that disadvantages 
one party to an arbitration certainly derogates from the integrity of the process. 
Thus, Mashaw's "equality" value will be built into the trinity of values suggested 
above to assess the arbitral process, through consideration of acceptability and ac-
curacy. 
61. David Feller has foreseen the end of the "Golden Age of Arbitration" in 
a recent, provocative article. Feller, Arbitration: The Days of Its Glory Are Num-
bered, 2 INDus. REL. W. 97 (1977). He suggests that labor arbitration should 
recapture its special status by maintaining the traditional role as a purely private 
system of industrial governance, ignoring external law and protecting "the hegemony 
of the collective agreement." Id. at 101, 107. Even an occasional "injustice" at 
the hands of arbitrators must be allowed: ''The system of industrial self government 
almost necessarily carries with it the possibility of injustice, not only to individual 
grievants, but also to many groups of employees and, as well, employers." Id. at 
127. It is apparent that reasonable persons can differ as to the correct solution 
to the same problem. The recognition that injustice may be a product of labor 
arbitration should suggest that an attempt be made to design a system that minimizes 
its occurrence. The developments in the external environment discussed by Feller 
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Before proceeding to define the elements of the basic arbitration 
model, two important caveats are in order. No suggestion is being 
made to transform labor arbitration into a civil court. Full trial-type 
procedures are neither necessary nor useful in labor arbitration. 
The basic arbitration model is not a proposal for establishment of 
a labor court. Such a major reorganization of the national labor law 
system does have proponents, and arguments in favor of ,the establish-
ment of a governmental tribunal need not be reiterated here. 62 A 
structural reform of that magnitude would require the development 
of a broad political consensus among management, labor, and public 
forces based on intense dissatisfaction with labor arbitration as it pres-
ently exists. A more realistic approach lies in giving attention to 
reform of the components of private labor arbitration. 
The second caveat addresses general analytical orientation. It 
should not be presumed that the suggestion that certain basic mini-
mum procedures are essential need constrict what Ted Jones has 
called "intelligent innovation."63 Only through a continual process 
of evaluation, commentary, and innovation will the components of 
the national labor law system evolve and mature. This continuing 
process seeks only a better system. 64 The perfect system will have 
to wait. 
Ill. A BASIC ARBITRATION MODEL 
The elements of tlle basic arbitration model include (1) an un-
biased adjudicator (2) who conducts a hearing in an informal yet 
orderly manner, (3) protecting the rights of the grievant, (4) in a 
proceeding for which a record is made; and (5) the arbitrator must 
render a reasoned decision, so that (6) a court can meaningfully re-
view the proceeding in order to ensure that the integrity of the ar-
bitral process has been maintained. 65 The elements of the proposed 
will not disappear. Labor arbitration must change to meet the challenge presented 
by these developments. An ostrich-like stance will not insulate the process from 
external impact. 
62. See, e.g., Morris, The National Labor Relations Board: Its Future, 26 LAB. 
L.J. 334 (1975). The opposing view suggesting the need for providing private mech-
anisms for resolving disputes outside the courts is in current vogue. See, e.g., Sander, 
Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 1 I 1 ( 1976). 
63. Jones, supra note 27, at 1242. 
64. A particularly noteworthy proposal for structural reform designed to deal 
with discrimination issues in arbitration has been suggested by Professor Harry Ed-
wards. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: A Proposal for 
Employer and Union Representatives, 27 LAIi. L.J. 265 (1976). 
65. The elements of the basic model are patterned in part after those set forth 
by the Supreme Court as relevant factors for a Title VII court to consider in appor-
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basic model are not offered as a template to be laid over any exist-
ing arbitration procedure to guarantee its legal sufficiency. Rather, 
they are suggested as approaches to reform, approaches to minimize 
arbitral weaknesses. The absence of certain elements of the basic 
model-e.g., an impartial arbitrator-would certainly vitiate any 
award resulting from the process. Other elements, such as the mak-
ing of a record, are suggested in order to allow meaningful judicial 
review of arbitral integrity. Absence of a record, then, should not 
automatically render an award null and void. 66 Although some ele-
ments are not mandatory, implementation of these permissive ele-
ments of the model would benefit the achievement of the values 
of accuracy, acceptability, and efficiency, and thus would protect the 
integrity of the process. 
A. An Unbiased Adjudicator 
The most important. component of the basic labor arbitration 
model is the presence-of an unbiased neutral who is capable of fairly 
adjudicating a dispute that the parties to a collective agreement have 
tioning weight to a prior arbitration finding: "Relevant factors include ... the 
degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record . . . 
and the special competence of particular arbitrators." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974). Although the Court was not ready to impose 
these procedural requirements on the parties, its suggestive footnote has encouraged 
practitioners, at least in potential Title VII cases, to focus on matters of procedural 
regularity in order to maximize the probability that the arbitration result will be 
given great weight in any subsequent court suit. 
66. The United States Arbitration Act provides for judicial vacation of arbitration 
awards 
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. 
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either 
of them. {c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evi-
dence pertinent and material to the controversy; or any other misbehavior by 
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced'. (d) Where the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, 
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970). Despite the express exclusion from coverage in § 1 of the 
Act for "contracts of employment of . . . any other class of workers engaged in 
• . . interstate commerce," the Act has been held applicable to labor arbitration 
by numerous federal courts. See the cases collected in Note, Labor Arbitration: 
Appealing the Procedural Decisions of Arbitrators, 59 MINN. L. REV. 109, 116 nn. 
33-35 (1974). 
The enumerated grounds for vacating awards, though certainly useful in evaluat-
ing arbitration procedures, do not comprehensively suggest the guideposts for con-
structing the basic arbitration model. Certainly an arbitration procedure that fails 
to pass muster under the Arbitration Act does not comply with the basic arbitration 
model, There are, however, additional elements to the model, such as the need 
for a record and a written opinion. The absence of such factors, though not man-
dating vacating the award under the Arbitration Act, nonetheless would detract 
from the integrity of the arbitral process. 
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not been able to settle themselves. 67 The essence of neutrality is 
being openminded, not empty-headed. 68 An arbitrator must be a 
person knowledgeable in the methods of conducting a hearing, fluent 
with the body of industrial jurisprudence, and receptive to the input 
of the parties on the common law of their shop. 69 
An arbitrator must possess expertise in labor relations, organ-
izational behavior, contract interpretation, and the fundamental ele-
ments of national labor law. 70 None of these qualities are reserved 
to lawyers, and those who would limit the corps of arbitrators to per-
sons trained in the law do a disservice to the industrial commu-
nity. 71 The labor arbitrator must not only be informed, he also 
must be capable of dealing with complex and emotional issues in 
a manner reassuring to the parties. Arbitration deals powerfully 
with important individual interests, and compassion, including a 
proper sensitivity to the stakes and emotions involved, is a credential 
fully necessary to an arbitrator's vita.72 
67. See, e.g., Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: The "Common Law 
of the Shop" v. External Law, 32 ARB. J. 65 (1977). 
68. "An amorphous dummy unspotted by human emotions [is not] a becoming 
receptacle for judicial power." Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 43 (1921) 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
69. Justice Douglas' characterization of labor arbitrators in the Steelworkers 
Trilogy as knowledgeable in the common law of the shop is correct insofar as he 
is referring to permanent umpires immersed in the ongoing problems of a major 
enterprise. The ad hoc arbitrator, however, though informed about the general op-
eration of industrial principles, comes to a hearing without prior knowledge of the 
special factors that make up the common law of the parties who have chosen him 
to arbitrate their dispute. It is important to emphasize that, in order to fulfill his 
adjudicatory role, the ad hoc arbitrator must be receptive to learning as much as 
is possible and relevant about the way the parties have designed their industrial 
relationship. 
70. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-
MANAGEMENT DISPUTES [hereinafter cited as ARB. CODE], reported in ARBITRATION 
-1975, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBI-
TRATORS 217 (B. Dennis & G. Somers eds. 1976), lists "honesty, integrity, impartial-
ity and general competence in labor relations matters" as essential personal qualifica-
tions of an arbitrator. ARB. CODE § I (A) (1). The Code was promulgated on No-
vember 30, 1974, by the National Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration 
Association, and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The standards 
set forth in the Code "are designed to guide the impartial third party serving in 
... diverse labor-management relationships." ARB. CODE, Preamble-Background. 
See also 29 C.F.R. § 1404.2 (1976). 
71. See Edwards, supra note 67, at 94-95 (arb;crators should not need "cer-
tification"); Jones, supra note 27, at 1251 n.36. 
72. Unlike judges and juries, arbitrators are able to blend into their decisions 
a wide range of normative considerations, not excluding their sympathy for the 
individuals caught in the contractual matrix within which the grievance erupted 
. . . Their scale of justice is commodious and affords room to weigh the human 
needs of the workers against the institutional demands of the employer. 
Coulson, Foreword to B. LANms, supra note 4, at ix. For a vivid example of com-
passion and an understanding of the very human problems involved in arbitration, 
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Because the biased arbitrator immutably taints the integrity of 
the process, 73 disclosure of prior or current personal or business deal-
ings with one of the parties must be the first order of business. 74 
Such matters must be revealed prior to appointment. Disclosure of 
such information to the unknowing party must not be delayed until 
the opening of a hearing, when the pressures of the moment might 
motivate a decision to allow the arbitrator to continue.7c; Moreover, 
there may be situations where disclosure alone is insufficient to meet 
the arbitrator's responsibility to the process: if he76 cannot free him-
self from a predisposition irrelevant to the facts of the particular dis-
pute, or, because of prior known relationships, cannot appear to be 
disinterested,77 ,the arbitrator must not accept appointment. 78 Pri-
see Arbitrator John C. Manson's recent opinion in Basic Magnesia, Inc., 69 LAD, 
ARB. REP. (BNA) 737 (1977). 
73. Impartiality of the adjudicator likewise lies at the core of administrative due 
process. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975); Jordan v. Massa-
chusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TEXT§ 12.01-.06 (1972); Boyer, supra note 47. 
74. An arbitrator must disclose "any current or past managerial, representational, 
or consultative relationship with any company or union involved in a proceeding 
in which he or she is being considered for appointment or bas been tentatively desig-
nated to serve. Disclosure must also be made of any pertinent pecuniary interest." 
ARB. CODE § Il(B)(l). An arbitrator must disclose if he or she "is serving con-
currently as an advocate for or representative of other companies or unions in labor 
relations matters." ARB. CODE § Il(B)(2). An arbitrator must disclose "any close 
personal relationship or other circumstance . . • which might reasonably raise a ques-
tion as to.the arbitrator's impartiality." ARB. CODE § Il(b)(3). And "[n]o person 
shall serve as a neutral Arbitrator in any arbitration in which he has any financial 
or personal interest in the result of the arbitration, unless the parties, in writing, 
waive such disqualification." VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION RULES OF THE AMER!• 
CAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (1975) [hereinafter cited as AAA RULES], Rule 11, 
quoted and discussed in Sherman, Labor Arbitrator's Duty of Disclosure, 31 U. PITT, 
L. REV. 377, 379 (1970). 
75. The Code and AAA Rules specify that this disclosure must be made prior 
to acceptance of an appointment. ARB. CODE§ 11(8)(3); AAA RULE 17. 
76. The masculine pronoun is employed for convenience. However, it is a regret-
table fact of arbitral life that very few arbitrators are women. 
77. In Public Util. Commn. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952), Justice 
Frankfurter recused himself and explained: 
The judicial process demands that a judge move within the framework of rele-
vant legal rules and the covenanted modes of thought for ascertaining them. 
He must think dispassionately and submerge private feeling on every aspect 
of a case. There is a good deal of shallow talk that the judicial robe does 
not change the man within it. It does. The fact is that on the whole judges 
do lay aside private views in discharging their judicial functions. This is 
achieved through training, professional habits, self-discipline and that fortunate 
alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation with which they are entrusted. 
But it is also true that reason cannot control the subconscious influence of 
feelings of which it is unaware. Where there is ground for believing that such 
unconscious feelings may operate in the ultimate judgment, or may not unfairly 
lead others to believe they are operating, judges recuse themselves. They do 
not sit in judgment. They do this for a variety of reasons. The guiding con-
sideration is that the administration of justice should reasonably appear to be 
disinterested as well as be so in fact. 
78. "If the arbitrator believes or perceives that there is a clear conflict of interest, 
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vate enforcement of this element of the arbitration model lies in the 
first instance with the individual arbitrator. 79 The ethical bound-
aries of the profession must ·be drawn by the people who make the 
system operate. Conscience is an uncertain policeman, but profes-
sional pride and individual integrity are resources not to be dis-
counted. 
The labor arbitrator must be an adjudicator, a decisionmaker. 
The itinerant problem solver who plays the shifting role of adjudi-
cator-mediator harms the integrity of the process. The otherwise 
appropriate suggestion that the parties should try to settle their own 
dispute must not be taken as an excuse for the arbitrator to par-
ticipate in the process of agreement. Once an arbitrator abandons 
his position as decisionmaker in order to act as an accommodator, 
he will be unabkto reassume an adjudicatory role later in the case. 
Consent awards-the polite term for "rigged awards"-are par-
tjcularly troubling. 80 Even though expressly authorized by the Code 
of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators in Labor-Management 
Disputes, 81 consent awards misleadingly portray settlements as the 
product of adjudication. Although it may be true that the optimal 
solution to an industrial dispute is a voluntary agreement reached 
privately by the parties, the use of the arbitrator's name and prestige 
to "sell" the result to rank-and-file members is a censurable misrep-
resentation. 82 The legitimacy of the adjudicatory process is cor-
he or she should withdraw, irrespective of the expressed desires of the parties." ARB. ,~·, 
CoDJ, § .II(B)(5). The AAA Rules, however, allow for a blanket written waiver 
by the parties. AAA RULE 11, quoted in note 74 supra. 
79. It may be cynical to suggest that a party may select an arbitrator because 
of a personal or business relationship, but it is generally recognized that the selection 
process involves an element of gamesmanship. Selecting an arbitrator on these 
grounds is, of course, short-sighted, as well as patently unethical, since the failure 
to disclose is a per se ground for vacation of the award. Cf. Commonwealth Coat-
ings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (undisclosed prior 
business dealing "which might create an impression of possible bias"). But see Local 
1296, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wash. 2d 156, 542 P.2d 
1252 (1975) (award not set aside under public-sector statute despite appearance of 
impropriety.) 
80. See generally Epstein, The "Agreed" Case: A Problem in Ethics, 20 ARB. 
J. 41 (1965); Fuller, supra note 35, at 20-22 (the rigged award is perhaps "the 
crassest infringement of adjudicative integrity"). 
81. The Code expressly authorizes consent awards provided the arbitrator is satis-
fied, based upon the evidence submitted, that the settled-upon position is proper, 
fair, sound, and lawful. ARB. CoDE § II(I). However, the Code also imposes a 
"responsibility" to seek to discover and "refuse to lend approval or consent to any 
collusive attempt by the parties to use arbitration for an improper purpose." ARB. 
CODE § Il(A) (2). 
82. Consent awards should be distinguished from stipulations of fact submitted 
by the parties. Stipulations streamline the arbitration process by adding to the effi-
ciency value, and thus they should be encouraged by the arbitrator. 
248 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 76:231 
roded to the extent that a consent award masquerades as an adjudica-
tion on the merits. 
When measured by the values of accuracy, efficiency, and ac-
ceptability, the need for an 1.J11biased adjudicator is manifest. The 
results reached iby an actually biased arbitrator are hardly accurate, 
and those produced by an apparently biased arbitrator are unaccept-
able even if correct. 83 Although it may be efficient to employ an 
arbitrator in the shifting role of adjudicator-mediator, that mixture 
is detrimental to the acceptability of a subsequent award and to the 
process of arbitration itself. A mediator becomes privy to facts and 
positions beyond the scope of those revealed to an arbitrator. The 
end result of mediation is an accommodation of conflicting interests; 
the end result of arbitration is a decision on the merits. Thus, join-
ing the processes destroys the independent posture of the arbitrator 
and doe's harm to the integrity of the process. 84 
The labor arbitrator must recognize that he serves two masters, 
one internal and one external to the arbitral process. The traditional 
role of the arbitrator as servant to the parties to the collective agree-
ment acknowledges only the internal master. The basic model also 
requires the arbitrator to recognize his responsibility to the ex-
ternal environment of public policy. National law has bestowed 
upon him enormous power to adjudicate in a final and binding man-
ner disputes that involve the interests of employees, unions, and 
management, and -that, .in turn, affect society at large. His deter-
mination is, for all practical purposes, a final disposition. 85 His 
award, if made public with the permission of the parties, becomes 
a guidepost for other arbitrators in the development of industrial 
jurisprudence. He must reconcile contractual rights with national 
law in those instances where they conflict. 86 In his conduct of the 
83. Canon 2 of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct and the accompanying com-
mentary require a judge to "conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes 
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. . . • A judge 
must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety." ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT 8 (1972). An arbitrator should be guided by the same considerations. 
84. See Fuller, supra note 35, at 23-42. 
85. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596. 
86. Dean Theodore St. Antoine recently developed the concept of arbitrator as 
"contract reader" in a short Article in this journal. St. Antoine, Judicial Review 
of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Secona Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 
75 MICH. L. RBv. 1137 (1977). According to St. Antoine, the arbitrator is the 
"joint 'alter ego' " of the parties "for the purpose of striking whatever supplementary 
bargain is necessary to handle the anticipated unanticipated omissions of the initial 
agreement." Id. at 1140. When there is a conflict between the parties' agreement 
and external public Jaw, "[w]ith a right good conscience, he should follow the con-
tract." Id. at 1142. Only if the parties have expressly or impliedly called upon 
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hearing, he must afford the parties the fullest protections of arbitral 
procedure in order to ensure the integrity of the system as a whole. 87 
If he remains passive in a situation where matters and interests ex-
ternal to the particular arbitration would counsel an active role, he 
may have preserved his short-run acceptability, but he will have 
damaged the long-term health of the system in which he has been 
privileged to perform the pivotal role. 
Mention must be made of what may well be a fundamental flaw 
in the labor arbitration system. In stark contrast to the judicial sys-
tem, an arbitrator is paid by the parties for whom he arbitrates, and 
thus full-time arbitrators depend for their very livelihood upon the 
preservation of their acceptability to those parties. 88 Were a judge 
placed in a similar position, any decision rendered would undoubt-
edly be invalid on its face. 89 Concern over the dysfunctional aspect 
of this payment arrangement has been minimized by the assumption 
that the overwhelming percentage of arbitrators remain unmoved by 
the financial implications of their awards. To suggest, however, that 
all arbitrators are oblivious to "how many he's decided for the union 
(management)" would be naive. The problem arises not with re-
the arbitrator to draw upon statutory or decisional sources should the adjudicator 
do more than merely "read" the contract in the light of "industrial practices and 
psychology." Id. at 1143, 1147-48. Professors Edwards and Feller agree that this 
is the proper limited role· for the arbitrator. Edwards, supra note 67, at 90; Feller, 
supra note 61. 
Yet St. Antoine acknowledges that-where "substantial rights of third parties, such 
as individual employees, intervene," St. Antoine, supra at 1161, the normal deference 
owing to the arbitrator's reading of the contract is inappropriate and a court on 
review must judge an award in light of external public policy. But if that is so, 
it should certainly be unacceptable to require an arbitrator to uphold consciously 
an illegal act-e.g., discharge of an employee on the basis of race--even if such 
employer conduct was allowed by the contract. Although it is useful to see the arbi-
trator as, in part, a "contract reader," the developments in the law of the collective 
agreement over the past two decades have made him something more than a "creature 
of the parties." The arbitrator has become an instrument of national labor policy. 
His decisions on the merits of a dispute are final and binding. Although in theory 
an award upholding an illegal act would be set aside in court, the practical barriers 
to court review of cost and delay are substantial. Where the external law clearly 
censures certain conduct, the arbitrator would be derelict in his duty to the parties 
were he to approve such illegal conduct and invite the parties to expend their own 
and judicial resources in post-arbitration litigation that would certainly lead to vaca-
tion of the award. There is no reason to countenance such inefficiency. 
87. The Arbitrators' Code notes that the "arbitrator must uphold the dignity and 
integrity of the office" while endeavoring "to provide effective service to the parties." 
ARB. (;ODE § l(C) (1). 
88. See Comment, Employee Challenges to Arbitral Awards: A Model for Pro-
tecting Individual Rights Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 125 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1310, 1334 (1977) (fundamental fact that arbitrator "is dependent for his 
livelihood on his acceptabi)ity to the parties who hire him"). 
89. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) ("(p]ossible tempta• 
tion to an average man"); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
250 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 76:~31 
gard to the case presenting a "clear winner" for either side, but 
rather with the close case where a decision either way is correct. 
Would ah a.1.1bitrator decide for the large corporation or the major 
international union in the hope that further appoi1;1.tments would flow 
from the favorable award? No answer is presently possible. How-
ever, a system based on self-appointed, self-paid judges contains this 
potential for abuse. 90 
Although reform appears to be needed in the method of com-
pensating arbitrators, it is not at all clear what that reform should 
be. At one time arbitrators on the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service roster were on the governmental payroll, 91 and they 
remain so today when serving on a Hospital Amendments' Board of 
Inquiry.92 Yet, even if arbitrators were paid by governmental entities, 
the problem would remain so long as the private parties were per-
mitted to choose their own arbitrator and arbitrators were paid by the 
case. Furthermore, COJ!lpletely removing the selection process from 
the pa.J.1ties would transform the private process into a labor court. 
Placing arbitrators on a full-time payroll would eliminate from the 
profession the many skilled part-time arbitrators. In any event, 
however, strong evidence that this 1nherent risk of bias has become 
reality would suggest the need for a fundamental alteration in the 
labor arbitration system. 
A final problem regarding the arbitrator is the disproportionate 
allocation of cases to a small group of arbitrators, a problem that 
arises because of the parties' self-selection of their arbitrator. Statis-
tics indicate that ninety per cent of all cases are decided by 1:en per 
cent of the arbitrators on the roster of the two appointing agencies, 03 
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), even though it is the 
position of both agencies that all arbitrators on their rosters are cap-
able of deciding most arbitral matters. The result of this grossly un-
even distribution of a11bitral resources is that arbitrations are delayed 
90. The fact that the arbitrator is an appointee of the parties subjects him 
to the political pressures of those who control his appointment. He is thereby 
confronted with a situation akin to a judge having to fear the power reaction 
against him from the party against whom he is inclined to make his decision. 
Some arbitrators inure themselves against such pressures. Others, especially 
those whose sole income is derived from arbitration, become quite sensitive to 
what the union or management can do to their position in consequence of their 
acts. 
Raffaele, Needed: A Fourth Party in Industrial Relations, 13 LAB. L.J. 230, 238 
(1962). 
91. R. FLEMING, supra note 4, at 51. 
92. 29 U.S.C. § 183(a), (d) (Supp. V 1975). 
93. Stessin, Expedited Arbitration: Less Grief over Grievances, HARV. Bus. 
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until the services of a member of the preferred corps can be ob-
tained. It is apparent that such delay is detrimental to both the effi-
ciency and the acceptability of the process. 
The appointing agencies should continue to urge labor and man-
agement to select lesser-used arbitrators in order to shorten the delay 
in obtaining a date for an arbitration hearing. 94 Arbitrators who 
cannot perform the important role of industrial adjudicators should 
be removed from the rosters and not offered to the parties for their 
selection. In addition, the appointing agencies must recognize that 
the continued expansion of the use of labor arbitration requires the 
development of an organized plan to train new arbitrators. While 
society trains lawyers and businessmen in an organized institutional 
fashion, similar preparation is not available to ar.bitrators. Serious 
consideration must be given to the establishment of an Institute of 
Arbitration with a faculty of senior experienced arbitrators to train 
prospective replacements. Graduates of such a program would have 
the added advantage of a credential attesting to their proficiency in 
the field, which might be a substantial aid in their gaining the accept-
ance of labor and management. 
B. A Hearing Conducted in an Informal Yet Orderly Manner 
The basic arbitration model requires that the hearing be con-
ducted in a manner that allows the participants to present their case 
fully to the arbitrator. 95 It is far better that the arbitrator hear too 
REV. 128 (Jan.-Feb. 1977). The two appointing agencies are the American Arbitra-
tion Association and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Michael F. 
Hoellering, Vice-President of the American Arbitration Association, recently reported 
that, of the 2600 arbitrators on the AAA roster, about 600 are chosen for 90% of the 
cases. 96 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 253, 254 (1977). 
94. The appointing agencies' efforts to encourage selection of new arbitrators 
has thus far been largely unsuccessful. See Jones & Smith, Management and Labor 
Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: A Report with Comments, 62 
MICH. L. REY. 1115, 1136 (1964). 
95. A great aid in making efficient use of the hearing time would be the devel-
opment of pre-hearing procedures. Fleming has suggested the use of pre-hearing 
conferences that narrow the issues to be adjudicated and catalyze settlements. R. 
FLEMING, supra note 4, at 64-65. Judicial pretrial discovery tools are, for the most 
part, inapposite to labor arbitration. Relevant documents should be exchanged as 
part of the grievance procedure. Failure to supply such relevant information may 
violate the statutory bargaining duty. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 
U.S. 432 (1967). 
A simple adjunct to the traditional practice of arbitration that offers the greatest 
potential for increasing the efficiency of the arbitral hearing would be to notify 
the arbitrator prior to the hearing about the parameters of the dispute he is to decide. 
This can be done through submission of pre-hearing statements, such as Fleming 
suggests, R. FLEMING, supra note 4, at 65-66, or simply by sending the arbitrator 
copies of the grievance, the management responses, the collective bargaining agree-
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much rather than too little, 00 and thus the arbitrator should encour-
age the parties to present their own case in a comprehensive fashion. 
All concerned should be satisfied that the issue or issues have been 
fully aired. 
The present arbitral practice of not binding the hearing pro-
cedure to the judicial rules of evidence is soundly based in practical 
realities. 97 Parties to the arbitration might not be represented by 
persons versed in the intricacies of evid~mtiary rules. To prohibit 
the introduction of evidence on technical grounds designed to keep 
unreliable testimony or documents from the ears of the untutored 
juror would demean the informed perception of the arbitrator and 
would add an irritant to the system while yielding little gain in accur-
acy. 98 Surely a skilled arbitrator can competently weigh evidence 
according to its probative value. 99 
The hearsay objection, commonly asserted in arbitration, should 
not be allowed to frustrate the presentation of evidence. Natural 
turnover in employment may mean that certain witnesses are un-
available to testify. If the statements of a person absent from the. 
hearing may significantly influence the arbitrator's final decision, the 
arbitrator should certainly inquire about the whereabouts of the wit-
ness and seek to have him testify.100 However, if the final choice 
is between listening to hearsay or not listening at all, the arbitrator 
should listen. 
A relaxed standard for receipt of evidence is, of course, a prime 
prescription for the therapeutic effect of labor arbitration, since in-
hibiting free and open testimony reduces the acceptability of the 
ment, and, if possible, a statement of the issue. Much hearing time is now ineffi-
ciently consumed in introducing the arbitrator to the issue at hand. "In the phrase-
ology of the courts, it is the 'pleadings' which are weak in arbitration." Id. at 
62. 
96. Shulman, supra note 1, at 1017. 
97. The AAA Rules state that "conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not 
be necessary." AAA Rule 28. For superb treatments of evidentiary matters in 
labor arbitration, see R. FLEMING, supra note 4; Jones, supra note 27. 
98. R. FLEMING, supra note 4, at 165. 
99. Likewise, the evidentiary requirements for the admission of documentary evi-
dence are normally surplusage. The relevant documents have undoubtedly been ex-
amined as part of the grievance procedure. Newly discovered documentary evidence 
is, at the very least, suspect. If the documents were discoverable earlier, an arbi-
trator will not likely allow such evidence to be introduced for the first time at the 
arbitral stage, not because of a lack of foundation or questionable authenticity, but 
rather because the parties have not had an opportunity to consider the evidence 
at earlier stages of the procedure. 
100. A common arbitral scenario involves a defe~e claim that the dischargee was 
provoked into striking the first blow by the word~- of a co-employee. An arbitrator 
must attempt to ascertain what was said, even if the testimony is hearsay. 
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process. Participants must feel that they "have had their say." The 
counterweight to this open-ended standard for the admission of evi-
dence is its possibly adverse impact on efficiency. To minimize 
this potential, the arbitrator should restrict repetitive testimony and, 
with regard to basically uncontroverted matters, seek stipulations 
from the parties so that the hearing does not bog down in unnecessary 
testimony. Again, each trade-off between admissibility of evidence 
and efficiency of the proceeding must be evaluated on -its own terms, 
but m order to avoid the risks to accuracy and acceptability of not 
hearing enough, the arbitrator generally should err in favor of admis-
sion of testimony. 
Labor arbitration is an adversary process. The arbitrator must 
run the hearing with full awareness ·that each party must present his 
case and test his opponent's evidence. Cross-examination, then, is 
as crucial in the arbitral hearing as it is in the courtroom.101 Thus, 
those arbitrators who inappropriately displace the advocates in both 
direct and cross-examination102 detract from the value of accept-
ability. Only after the testimony of any witness is completed should 
the arbitrator intervene for his own purposes with clarifying ques-
tions for the witness. 
Of course, the arbitrator is placed in a most difficult position 
when the parties have not presenwd a complete case. Knowledge-
able of arbitral jurisprudence, the arbitrator may recognize that an 
additional line of questioning is required to explicate fully a party's 
position. Should he ask the questions n~essary to bring the case 
to completion? The answer may depend on the precise nature of 
the inquiry. If the arbitrator senses that an otherwise skillful advo-
cate is purposefully avoiding a line of inquiry, 103 he should stand 
mute. On the other hand, the arbitrator has a clear responsibility 
to educate and assist the parties in those instances where failure to 
inquire into a particular matter may obstruct industrial justice. 
Needless to say, a difficult question of balance is pres~nted. Al-
though the basic arbitral model allows the arbitrator great leeway 
101. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses has been considered es-
sential to administrative due process, see, e.g., Willner v. Commission on Character 
& Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), especially where decisions are based on questions 
of fact, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
102. The Code cautions that the "arbitrator should not intrude into a party's pre• 
sentation so as to prevent that party from putting forth its case fairly and· ade-
quately." ARB. CODE§ V(A)(l)(c).· 
103. The analogous situation is presented by the absence of the dischargee from 
the arbitration hearing. Most arbitrators realize that if the dischargee is not there, 
he is undoubtedly confined elsewhere. Questioning his whereabouts can be mutually 
embarrassing. 
254 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:231 
to question witnesses, his exercise of the prerogative may be coun-
terproductive to the extent that it impedes a party's presentation of 
his own case or annoys the party whose opponent is aided by the 
inquiry. In sum, circumspection is clearly required, but the arbi-
trator's primary responsibility is to produce a correct result, and his 
authority must ultimately be exercised in light of that duty. 
The basic arbitration model does not require the arbitrator to 
run the hearing in a judicial fashion. The trappings of the court-
room-a robed magistrate, strict rules of decorum and dress, bailiff 
and law clerks-are, of course, inapposite to the informal atmo-
sphere of the labor arbitration hearing room. Parties should feel 
comfortable in arbitration. Nevertheless, arbitration is a serious 
enterprise and the hearing should proceed with a maximum of 
ordered informality. Mutual respect between the arbitrator and the 
parties is essential. Procedures can be tailored to meet the inclina-
tions of the parties so long as they remain consistent with the basic 
rights of those concerned. A grievant must be allowed to hear and 
confront his accusers and to be present throughout the hearing, 1°4 
Continuances must be granted by the arbitrator unless they are pur-
posefully obstructive.105 If witnesses are not sworn, they should be 
advised by the arbitrator that they are expected to tell the truth. 
Finally, at the conclusion of the hearing, all parties should be given 
the opportunity to make any further statement they desire.100 
C. Rights of the Grievant 
The procedures of the arbitration hearing must be designed to 
assure the parties that their dispute has been given a complete and 
fair examination. This assurance is particularly crucial for the 
grievant, who is likely to be the party with the most at stake, given 
that his job rights are in dispute. Unfortunately, the traditional arbi-
104. Douglas Aircraft Co., 28 LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 198 (1957) (Jones, Arb,). 
Fleming notes that "very sensitive personal rights and fundamental considerations of 
fairness" require confrontation and cross-examination. R. FLEMING, supra note 4, 
at 175. The AAA Rules expressly entitle persons "having a direct interest in the 
arbitration . • . to attend bearings." AAA RULE 22. 
105. The NLRB has considered the failure to grant a reasonable request for a 
continuance as one ground for refusing to defer to a prior arbitration award. Gate-
way Transp. Co., 137 N.LR.B. 1763, 1764 (1962). 
106. The court concludes that both parties have the right to assume that any 
arbitration hearing in which they may become involved, pursuant to their agree-
ment, will afford them the opportunity of presenting all of their material evi-
dence and that the Arbitrator, before closing the hearing, will inquire of all 
parties whether they have any further proofs to off er or witnesses to be heard. 
Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488, 492 (C.D. Calif, 
1967) (emphasis original). 
December 1977] The Arbitral Process 255 
tration model has not focused upon ·the need to satisfy the grievant 
that he is getting a full and fair hearing. Indeed, one might well pro-
ject that erosion 'of labor arbitration's present preferred status in 
national labor policy is most likely to come in those cases involving 
the job rights of individual grievants. Clearly, one of the arbitrator's 
paramount responsibilities is to see that the procedures followed at 
the hearing assure the grievant that his daim has been decided on 
the merits. 
A more difficult question involves the arbitrator's appropriate 
stance when a grievant claims a right to separate representation. 
What should the arbitrator do when the grievant appears at the hear-
ing with his own attorney and the union or the company objects to 
the presence of his counsel? Does the grievant have a right to his 
own counsel? 
Many arbitrators will respond by saying that they are the servants 
of the parties to the contract107 and that the grievant thus has no 
right to separate representation.108 As a practical matter, however, 
both union and management would be shortsighted if they ignored 
the fact that a grievant who is sufficiently disenchanted with his 
union to have obtained separate counsel will undoubtedly pursue 
other remedies-i.e., a duty of fair representation suit109 or, in an 
appropriate case, a Title VII suit110-if he does not win in arbitra-
tion. 
The arbitrator should seek to alleviate the problem of separate 
grievant representation by seeking an accommodation, perhaps by 
allowing grievant's counsel to cross-examine witnesses and remain 
in attendance at the hearing. If voluntary accommodation cannot be 
reached, the basic arbitration model requires the arbitrator to allow 
at least limited participation by grievant's counsel. Given the 
grievant's stake in the hearing, the arbitrator cannot, consistent with 
his responsibility :to the national labor law system, allow the hearing 
to proceed in the enforced absence of the grievant's own representa-
tive. The practical effect of recognizing this limited right to counsel 
is to encourage the parties to the collective agreement to attempt 
107. To use Arbitrator J.A. Raffaele's more colorful phraseology, "the direct off-
spring of the parties in industrial relations, born out of wedlock." Raffaele, supra 
note 56, at 236. 
108. The AAA Rules provide that "[a]ny party may be represented ,at the hearing 
by counsel or by other authorized representative." AAA RULE 20. A "party," which 
is undefined in the rules, apparently does not include the grievant. See Blake v. USM 
Corp., 94 L.R.R.M. 2509 (D.N.H. 1977). 
109. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
110. See Alexander v •. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
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to satisfy the individual grievant that the established system ade-
quately protects his interests. The grievant must be convinced that 
he will receive a "fair shake" through arbitration, and parties unable 
to inspire that degree of individual satisfaction must "suffer" the 
presence of an outsider. 
Although the above conclusion should not be read as discounting 
the union's countervailing interest in acting as the sole representative 
of complaining employees, it necessarily acknowledges that the 
union's interest has limitations. Although arbitration hearings where 
the union objects to an outsider's presence and participation should 
be avoided, 111 in the overwhelming number of instances the problem 
of separate representation will either not arise or will be soluble 
through informed accommodation. In the very small number of 
cases where accommodation is impossible, the arbitrator must recog-
nize the grievant's limited right to separate representation.112 
D. A Record of the Proceeding and a Decision with Reasons 
Based on Evidence Presented 
The basic labor arbitration model requires that a record be made 
of the proceedings and that the arbitrator write a decision based on 
the evidence presented at that hearing.113 If labor arbitration were 
111. Concerning distribution of control of procedures, see generally J. Tumour 
& L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). 
112. The due process cases on right to counsel in an administrative hearing are 
of minimal help. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court found coun-
sel to be essential in a welfare termination hearing. The untutored welfare recipient 
needed counsel to "help delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an 
orderly manner, conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard the interests of 
the recipient.'' 397 U.S. at 270. The individual grievant in arbitration is not equally 
disadvantaged; he does have union representation. But when that representation is 
primarily directed at protecting associational interests, or at least when the disen-
chanted grievant so believes, a limited right to separate counsel is in order. As the 
Court in Goldberg noted: "We do not anticipate that this assistance [in a welfare 
termination proceeding] ·will unduly prolong or otherwise encumber the hearing.'' 
397 U.S. at 271. With that caveat, limited separate representation should be allowed 
in arbitration. See also Administrative Procedure Act § 6(a), 5 U.S.C. § 55S(b) 
(1976). 
113. Justice Douglas plainly stated in dictum in Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 
598, that "[a]rbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an 
award.'' However, that blanket dispensation is proffered merely in support of his 
conclusion that an ambiguous award may be enforced lest arbitrators "play it safe 
by writing no supporting opinions." 363 U.S. at 598. That result would be "undesir-
able," said Justice Douglas, "(or a well-reasoned opinion tends to engender confidence 
in the integrity of the process and aids in clarifying the underlying agreement." 363 
U.S. at 598. Thus the Supreme Court has suggested those very reasons why "a well-
reasoned opirlion" is essential to maintain the acceptability of the process. But see 
R. FLEMING, supra note 4, at 53-S5 (record and opinion characterized as costly 
"frills"). 
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a self-contained process with no review available, perhaps no record 
would need to be made and no opinion would need to be written. 
In fact, however, under the Steelworkers Trilogy, 114 some small 
measure of merit review is available, 115 for the court, when consider-
ing a petition to vacate or enforce an award, must determine if the 
arbitrator has drawn his "essence" from the collective agreement.116 
In the absence of some form of record and recitation by the ar-
bitrator on the basis for his decision, it is impossible for a court to 
/ 
make even that limited determination. 
The record requirement also makes possible judicial monitoring 
of arbitral procedures. If the losing party attacks an award on the 
ground, for example, that the arbitrator was biased or that he refused 
to allow cross-examination of a witness, the record will support or 
refute the claim. A record is far more reliable than oral testimony 
as evidence of what occurred at a hearing many months, or even 
years, before. Moreover, the record requirement can be met easily 
by the use of an inexpensive tape recording.117 A stenographic rec-
ord, although a pleasure to an arbitrator, is both a financial burden 
to the parties, and, more important, a source of great delay in the 
final resolution of disputes.U8 The tape recording would be trans-
cribed only in the event of judicial review, thus minimizing delay 
and yet equipping the court to resolve claims that the integrity of 
the process was not maintained.119 
114. See note 6 supra. 
115. The Second Circuit, in the much-cited Torrington decision, indicated that 
a court must give "meaningful review." Torrington Co. v. Metal Workers Local 
1645, 362 F.2d 677, 680 (1966). 
116. 363 U.S. at 597. 
117. It is difficult to estimate how common the use of a tape recorder is in ar-
bitration. This idea was suggested to this author by Dean Theodore St. Antoine, who 
uses a tape recorder- to supplement his note taking during an arbitration. In addition, 
see Mobil Co., 46 LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 140 (01966) (Hebert, Arb.). In a 
proceeding where a stenographic record is not being made, an arbitrator will usually 
take copious notes. When crucial testimony is about to be given in the hearing, an 
arbitrator will attempt to take verbatim notes. He may find it necessary to advise 
the witness to "slow down" or repeat, thus allowing him to record the important evi-
dence accurately. This signal is not lost on thll witness, who then carefully selects 
his words. As a practical matter, the use of a continuous tape recording avoids this 
effect on testimony. 
118. The AAA Rules make a stenographic record optional with the parties. 
AAA RULE 21. The Arbitrator's Code likewise places the decision regarding use of 
a transcript in the hands of the parties, although an arbitrator may seek to persuade 
the parties "to use a transcript if the nature of the case appears to require one." ARB. 
CODE§ V(B)(l) (b). 
119. The need for a record is exemplified by Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. 
Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), affd. in part and revd. in part, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 423.U.S. 892 (1975). The grievant was discharged for violating a plant 
rule prohibiting the making of "false, vicious or malicious statements concerning any 
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The requirement of a reasoned arbitral decision serves both an 
internal and an external function in the arbitration model. A con-
cise, reasoned decision makes the arbitral process more acceptable 
to the parties affected by it.120 The loser can discover and, one 
hopes, come to accept why he lost on the merits. Employees in the 
shop directly affected by the decision can read the arbitrator's deci-
sion and can at least understand that he did not decide against them 
on whim or prejudice. For the arbitrator, the process of explaining 
a decision in a reasoned fashion may improve his confidence that 
the decision is proper or help him transform a wrong decision into 
a correct one.121 For the court on review, a reasoned written deci-
sion is the evidence upon which to make the ''.essence review" man-
dated by the Steelworkers Trilogy .122 It is the ultimate indication 
employee or which affect the employee's relationship to bis job, his supervisors, or 
the Company's products, property, reputation, or good will in the community," 381 
F. Supp. at 194-95. Holodak was a dissident who wrote an article denouncing his 
company, bis union, and their permanent umpire. His discharge was upheld in a one-
sentence award, stating that the proof "establishes the just cause for the discharge 
... with conclusive finality." 381 F. Supp. at 197. Indeed, the arbitral award prob-
ably would have had "conclusive finality" were it not for the fact that a full record 
was made of the proceedings. The transcript vividly demonstrated the "evident par-
tiality" of the arbitrator, who was himself one of the objects of Holodnak's allegedly 
censurable article. During the hearing the arbitrator repeatedly, and in an offensive 
manner, questioned the grievant about his motives in writing the article, inquired 
into his political and social views, openly badgered the grievant, and sought to make 
Holodnak confess to the errors of his ways. 381 F. Supp. at 196, 198. The court 
concluded that "the transcript of the arbitration here discloses substantial evidence 
of partiality on the part of the arbitrator, if not open hostility toward" the grievant, 
which required that the award be vacated. 381 F. Supp. at 198-99. 
Although it is true that a grievant could assert such arbitral misconduct by testi-
monial proof subject to a resolution of credibility, the availability of a record assures 
that the reviewing court can effectively carry on its function to defend the integrity 
of the arbitral process against such procedures. "It is said that the palest ink is more 
accurate than the most retentive memory." F. ELKOURI & E. ELKouru, supra note 
29, at 218. 
120. The opinion should not be a logorrheic treatment of every corner of the dis-
pute. Nor should it necessarily look like a judicial opinion. "Latin expressions . • . 
may lend a certain dignity to judicial opinions. They can hardly serve any purpose 
in an arbitration award." Fuller, supra note 35, at 6. It is important that the ar-
bitrator address the main arguments made by the parties so that they appreciate that 
attention was paid to their contentions. On the other hand, padding an opinion with 
the equivalent of dictum is, at the very least, "arbitral feather-bedding," R. FLEMING, 
supra note 4, at 135, and may address issues that the parties would prefer to have 
left unresolved. 
121. "When an adjudicator knows that he must record his judgments and give rea-
sons for them, there are fruitful psychological effects, In Felix Frankfurter's words, 
we all feel much more responsible 'if we have to sit down and write out why we 
think what we think.'" w. GELLHORN, SECURITY, LoYALTY, AND ScIENCE, 212-13 
(1950) (quoting Frankfurter's remarks in Functions and Procedure of Administrative 
Tribunals (a report on The Cincinnati Conference), 12 U. CIN. L. REV. 117, 276 
(1938) ). 
122. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. 
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of whether the arbitrator met his responsibilities to the parties and 
to the process. 123 
The basic arbitration model requires that the arbitrator's opinion 
and award be rendered expeditiously. While a thirty-day standard 
might seem naively optimistic, especially in light of the present norm 
of approximately forty-five days, it is of paramount importance to 
efficiency and acceptability that the decisional process be com-
pressed.124 Arbitrators will acknowledge that most cases are not dif-
ficult, and some may even admit that study time, except for actual 
drafting, is brief. For the truly complex case, an extended time 
period may be necessary.125 
It is a basic tenet of labor arbitration that there is no binding 
precedent controlling the labor arbitrator. This "truism" misrepre-
sents reality. Arbitrators have developed a body of arbitral juris-
prudence. 126 Although many arbitrators decide cases without citing 
the opinions of their colleagues, they are cognizant of the substantive 
principles that have guided like determinations. A written opinion 
fleshes out those principles in a form useful to the parties affected 
and acts as a guidepost for future private resolution of industrial dis-
putes. 
E. Meaningful Judicial Review 
The Steelworkers Trilogy teaches that the scope of judicial re-
view is limited to an inquiry into whether the arbitrator's award 
123. Judge Frank Coffin, dissenting in Walsh v. Picard, 446 F.2d 1209, 1214 (1st 
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1972), suggested that a statement of reasons 
by an adjudicatory body-in that case, an appellate criminal sentence review panel 
of judges-is necessary for the development of consistent principles for decision-
making and is "essential to enable further review to take place." If further review 
is circumscribed, as it is in labor arbitration, "due process requires the minimum in-
ternal check of an expressed rationale." 446 F.2d at 1214. Thus, without an ex-
planation of the decision there is no way of knowing whether the adjudicator-for 
our purposes, the arbitrator-performed his "primary function of rationally evalu-
ating the facts and arguments put before" him. 446 F.2d at 1214. 
124. The AAA Rules requires the rendering of the award within 30 days, unless 
that period is extended by the parties. AAA RULE 37. FMCS "encourages" ar-
bitrators to render an award in 60 days. 29 C.F.R. § 1404.15 (1976). The Arbitra-
tors' Code neither recommends nor suggests any time limit for submission of decis-
ions. 
125. It would seem that bench awards or expedited arbitration without opinion 
would be inconsistent with the basic model. Some accommodation might be made 
for such innovative techniques in situations where only contract rights are in question 
or, when discharge or discipline is involved, where the grievant knowingly waives the 
opportunity to have a reasoned written award. Of course, streamlined arbitration 
should never be an excuse for incorrect decisions. 
126. See F. ELKOURJ, & E. ELKOURJ, supra note 29. 
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"draws its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement.127 
This enigmatic standard understates the role the federal courts 
should play in ensuring the integrity of the arbitral process. The 
federal court, after all, must not only articulate the federal law of 
the labor agreement, 128 but must also ensure that federal labor policy 
is effected through private labor arbitration. 
The Supreme Court's reluctance to have federal judges second-
guess labor arbitrators on the merits of arbitration cases is grounded 
largely upon its perception that arbitrators, and not judges, are the 
experts in industrial relations. A limited review standard on merit 
questions is appropriate, however, for a more telling reason. In 
order to facilitate national labor goals, the arbitration result must be 
final and binding.129 Disputes should be conclusively resolved pri-
vately. Protracted litigation acts as an irritant in the industrial rela-
tionship and runs counter to the parties' own voluntary commitment 
to have an arbitrator, and not a court, decide the substance of the 
dispute. Plenary review of merit determinations would destroy final-
ity. As long as the award is the product of a fair arbitration process, it 
must stand in the absence of manifest error on the part of the ar-
bitrator.130 The current situation of few review petitions and even 
127. The Third Circuit elaborated on the "essence test" in Ludwig Honold Mfg. 
Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (1969): An arbitration award "does 'draw its 
essence from the collective bargaining agreement' if the interpretation can in any ra-
tional way be derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its 
context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention; only where there is a manifest 
disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction 
and the law of the shop, may a reviewing court disturb the award." 
128. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
129. 'Tf]he essence of the arbitration process is that the arbitrator's decision 
shall put the dispute to rest." Dunau, supra note 11, at 427. Dunau insisted that 
the "imperative of finality" was not based "on the invidious judgment that the ar-
bitrator's competence is superior to the judge's . . . . [l]t is not necessary or desir-
able to rapturiz.e arbitrators as a class or to denigrate judges as a class to conclude 
that the power of decision must stay where the parties have put it." Id. at 427, 428 
n.3. 
130. For example, were the arbitrator to uphold a management action that was 
both expressly and definitively prohibited by a clear contractual statement and sup-
ported by bargaining history and an unwavering union insistence on its enforcement, 
a federal court might conclude that clear error had been shown. Such an award 
"draws its essence" only from the mind of the misguided arbitrator. See, e.g., 
Electronics Corp. v. Electrical Workers Local 272, 492 F.2d 1255, 1257 (1st Cir. 
1974) ("sole articulated basis for [arbitrator's] award was concededly .•. a non-
fact"); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central Ga. Ry., 415 F.2d 403, 415, (5th 
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970) (arbitrator's decision "unfounded in 
reason and fact"); Safeway Stores v. Bakery Workers Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 82 
(5th Cir. 1968) (arbitrator's reasoning "so palpably faulty that no judge, or group 
of judges, could ever conceivably have made such a ruling"). Although Dean St. 
Antoine criticizes the approach of these courts, he is "reluctantly prepared to accept 
an . . . exception to the finality doctrine" for a decision that is "actually and indis-
putably without foundation in reason or fact." St. Antoine, supra note 86, at 1149, 
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fewer successful contests should not be disturbed.131 
On the other hand, the federal courts must remain open to chal-
lenges to arbitral awards based on alleged impairment of the process' 
integrity, 132 especially when the job rights of individual employees 
are at stake.133 Of course, that emphasis upon judicial review of 
arbitral "process" poses a risk to finality, but it is a risk the Court 
has seen fit to run in the past, and with good reason. 134 Arbitral 
awards which are the product of prejudicial procedural defects are 
not merely null and void; they do grievous injury to the parties' ac-
ceptance of the process as the appropriate forum for private resolu-
tion of industrial disputes. Were the courts to enforce such defec-
tive awards, the full power of the federal government would be 
placed behind an arbitral malignancy, raising serious constitutional 
due process questions. 135 To limit the risks such review presents 
131. "Arbitration decisions are rarely brought to court on appeal. In the over-
whelming majority of that miniscule portion which are appealed, only an infinites-
imal few have ever been vacated." Jones, supra note 27, at 1296. 
132. A reviewing court must recognize that an arbitration hearing, like a judicial 
hearing, need not achieve procedural perfection. "In an arbitration case a court can-
not act as a legal screen to comb the record for technical errors in the receipt of 
evidence by arbitrators . . . . [A]n award will not be vacated because of an errone-
ous ruling by arbitrators, which does not affect the fairness of the proceeding as a 
whole." Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 
F.2d 594, 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1968). Cf. Transport Workers Union v. Philadelphia 
Transp. Co., 283 F. Supp. 597, 600 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (attack on credibility of wit-
nesses not suitable basis for court displacement of arbitrator's judgment.) A variant 
of the "harmless error'' doctrine would appropriately apply so long as the essential 
integrity of the process is maintained. See Dunau, supra note 11, at 436. 
133. See, Dunau, supra note 11, at 437-39. Individual employees do not ·have 
the right to challenge a completed arbitration on substantive or procedural grounds 
without first proving that their union breached its duty of fair representation in pre-
senting their claim. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Worthy of some attention 
is a recent proposal of an alternative model allowing for employee standing to attack 
an arbitrator's award without being required to make this threshold showing of 
union misconduct. See Comment, supra note 88. 
134. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). 
135. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
An argument can be made that the action of labor arbitrators is governmental 
action and thus subject to constitutional structures. When a state delegates public 
functions to private parties, the private parties must act in a manner consistent with 
constitutional principles. See generally Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
In the absence of an arbitration system, contractual rights would be perfectable in 
court. Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195 (1962). Where there is such 
a system, the federal common law of labor arbitration delegates the otherwise public 
function of contract adjudication to the arbitrator, whose award is then readily en-
forced by the court. Arbitrators are "invested, pro hac vice, with judicial functions," 
Strong v. Strong, 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 560, 570 (1852), and are to be judged by even 
stricter ethical standards than judges because their awards are subject to only limited 
review. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 
(1968). The union party to an arbitration is· likewise "clothed with power not un-
like that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power 
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to finality, the Court should set forth with particularity the funda-
mental prerequisites of a fair arbitration. Spurious suits to vacate 
awards should be deterred by a clear articulation of the criteria for 
review. Courts can also make effective use of summary procedures 
to test the facial adequacy of petitioners' claims of procedural defi-
ciency. Of course, these steps can only reduce-not eliminate-the 
costs to finality of judicial review of the arbitral process, but, in the 
final analysis, these costs are a worthwhile price to pay for increasing 
the acceptability of the process as a whole.136 
F. Achieving Reform 
There are several strategies available for implementing the 
above suggestions. The simplest and most likely approach to reform 
is through voluntary adoption by the parties to a collective agree-
ment. Union and management have the primary interest in the integ-
rity of the process that interprets and applies their agreement. 
Whether the parties will so act, of course, depends first on whether 
they agree that the suggested procedural baseline will maximize 
the values of accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability.137 But, regard-
less of their endorsement of the particular reforms here suggested, 
the private parties must recognize, purely as a matter of self-interest, 
that national labor policy demands responsible action to ensure the 
integrity of their private means for adjusting disputes. 
A second, though less direct mechanism for achieving procedural 
reform, is through the appointing agencies, the AAA and FMCS. 
Private reevaluation of labor arbitration can be promoted through 
to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of those for whom it legis-
lates and which is also under an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect 
those rights." Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). See Jones, 
supra note 27, at 1250. 
136. Ted Jones has warned that arbitrators must not "function (or talk) like 
judges or Labor Board members," lest arbitral insulation from judicial review give 
way to "reversing review." Jones, supra note 27, at 1252. Arbitrators must "con-
tinue to act like arbitrators," and the basic model should not be read as transforming 
their substantive role. 
The primary goal of the suggested model is to ensure that labor arbitration does 
not lose its special status in the scheme of national labor policy. The price of build-
ing a minimum procedural floor of adequate fair process is a loss of the totally un-
structured flexibility as a private dispute-resolving mechanism that now characterizes 
labor arbitration. But parties should continue to be able to tailor arbiti;ation pro-
cedure to fit their own desires so long as a minimum level of procedural integrity 
is maintained. A formless ad hoc process that is susceptible to abuse by the parties 
to the detriment of others affected by the· institution both inside and outside of the 
shop will not long remain a cornerstone of national labor policy. 
137. One would think that all parties would agree that accuracy, efficiency, and 
acceptability are appropriate goals to be achieved by the arbitral process. 
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their power to establish new guidelines for the process. The in-
fluence of such promulgations on the private parties must not be dis-
counted, just as the agencies themselves must recognize their impor-
tant roles as advisors to union and management. 
If the participants default in their obligation to reevaluate arbitral 
procedures, the impetus for reform must fall on the courts. It is 
the federal courts, after all, who elevated labor arbitration to its pres-
ent prominence, and it is they who under section 301138 have as-
sumed the responsibility for elaborating basic arbitration principles 
and procedures. Moreover, the common-law components of the law 
of the labor agreement are continuously open for revision suggested 
by changing realities.139 As Holmes stated almost a century ago, 
the common law "is forever adopting new principles from life at one 
end, and it always retains old ones from history at the other, which 
have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It will ·be entirely con-
sistent only when it ceases to grow."140 Through the developing 
common law of the labor agreement, the courts have both the oppor-
tunity and the responsibility to see that the integrity of the arbitral 
process is maintained.141 
The final strategy to achieve arbitral reform lies in congressional 
action. It was, of course, the legislative branch that thirty years ago 
first authorized suits concerning collective bargaining agreements.142 
Though surely the least feasible of the potential instruments for re-
form, Congress remains available as a final resource to mandate the 
138. Labor-Management Relations Act§ 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). 
139. Robben Fleming projected over a decade ago that courts might apply strict 
due process requirements to certain aspects of labor arbitration. R. FLEMING, supra 
note 4, at 174, 198. Procedural regularity should be ensured, in any case, as a matter 
of policy "from the standpoint of the arbitrator and the parties in the sense that the 
arbitration process will have dignity, integrity and fairness in evecy respect, and 
policy from the standpoint of the company and the union in that the methods which 
are used in processing and tcying grievances will contribute to the harmonious and 
productive relationship of the parties." Id. at 198. These policy considerations 
should motivate judicial implementation of the basic arbitration model. 
140. 0.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881). 
141. The National Labor Relations Board has the opportunity to play a role in 
the reform of arbitration through the premises of review developed in Spielberg Mfg. 
Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). Under the Spielberg standards the Labor Board will 
defer to arbitration awards if the arbitral proceedings were fair and regular. These 
conditions were explicated in Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416, 
1421 (1961), to require that "the procedures adopted meet normal standards ~s to 
sufficiency, fairness and regularity ... [with no] evidence of irregularity, collusion 
or inadequate provisions for the taking of testimony." Although the number of ar-
bitration awards brought to the Labor Board for review are comparatively small, the 
influence of Labor Board insistence upon such regularization of labor arbitration 
process will ripple beyond those cases actually considered. 
142. Labor-Management Relations Act § 30l(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). 
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basic procedure required to ensure minimum integrity in the labor 
arbitration process. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Even though private labor arbitration is undoubtedly an in-
genious industrial invention, "one of democracy's most successful ex-
periments in private self-govemment,"143 it deserves a considered 
reappraisal. One may conclude that the basic labor arbitration 
model suggested here is "much ado about nothing," or see in it the 
spectre of "galloping legalism." One thing is certain: only through 
continued reevaluation will the arbitration process fulfill its prom-
ise. 144 If the actual practice of labor arbitration is examined by 
those. affected by the process and the checkup indicates a fine state 
of health, then the objective of this proposal has been achieved. If 
the diagnosis indicates some treatment is in order, the proposed 
model may be useful as a prescription for fitness. Only a healthy 
private labor arbitration system will promote the national goals of 
equity and peace in the work place, and only a sound labor arbitra-
tion system deserves a preferred status in the scheme of national 
labor policy. 
143. R. FLEMING, supra note 4, at 223. 
144. Harry Edward's recent caution should be noted: "One should ask whether 
uniformity and codification in the arbitration business is really progress or whether 
it merely reflects the building of an even more ornate and top-heavy superstructure 
on a simple and sound foundation, but a foundation never intended to bear such 
weight." Edwards, supra note 67, at 94. Labor arbitration may never have been 
intended to play a central role in the administration of national labor policy, but, 
intended or not, it has been elevated to that position. It now must be made to serve 
its new pUfPOse. 
